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RECENT CASES
abdicated its duty to act as the balancing factor on the other
branches of government. If the legislature will not police itself
and the courts will not intervene, persons inside our prisons will
continue to be "out of sight and out of mind" and subject to the
caprices of their jailors.
ROBERT E. WHITE
PROPERTY-SALE OF STOCK AND PROPRIETARY LEASE IN Co-
OPERATIVE APARTMENT HELD AS SALE OF PERSONALTY
Plaintiff Silverman had deposited $15,400 with defendant
Alcoa Plaza Associates1 as down payment for the purchase of shares
of stock and a proprietary lease in a cooperative apartment. The
total purchase price was to be $154,000. Silverman defaulted and
Alcoa retained the deposit as damages. Alcoa subsequently sold
the stock and lease to a third party for the same price. Upon learn-
ing of this transaction, Silverman instituted suit for recovery of the
deposit, seeking to limit Alcoa to its actual damages. On motion
for summary judgment, Alcoa contended that Silverman had
wilfully breached a contract involving the sale of real estate, and
thus Alcoa was entitled to retain the deposit. The supreme court
at special term2 granted Alcoa's motion, holding that the stock
could not be characterized as "goods" under article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code,3 but rather that the sale involved real
property with damages awardable accordingly. The appellate divi-
sion reversed, granting Silverman's cross motion for summary
judgment, and remanded for a hearing regarding damages. Held,
shares of cooperative stock relative to a proprietary lease are
"goods" within article 2 of the U.C.C.; as such, the rights of the
parties regarding the deposit should be determined in accordance
1. Hereinafter referred to as Alcoa.
2. Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Associates, 37 App. Div. 2d 166, 167, 323 N.Y.S..2d 39,
40 (Ist Dep't 1971) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
3. N.Y. U.C.C., art. 2, § 2-105 (1) (McKinney 1964) provides that:
'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than money
in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in
action.
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with section 2-718. 4 Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Associates, 37 App.
Div. 2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1st Dep't 1971).
There is a significant difference between personal and real
property. Personal property is statutorily defined as including cer-
tain tangibles and everything which may be the subject of owner-
ship except real property.5 Real property is defined as being
"coextensive in meaning with lands, tenements and heredita-
ments."' The distinction is especially relevant when the measure
of damages is involved. Classifying the transaction as involving
personal or real property is antecedent to determining whether or
not the seller-vendor may retain the buyer-vendee's deposit. If
the action is one for damages resulting from a buyer's breach in-
volving personal property (goods), the seller may recover the
difference between the resale price and the contract price together
with any permissible incidental damages, but less expenses saved
4. Id. at § 2-718 provides that:
1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but
only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience
or nonfeasability of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing un-
reasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods because of the buyer's
breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution of any amount by which the sum of his
payments exceeds
(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of terms liqui-
dating the seller's damages in accordance with subsection (1), or
(b) in the absence of such terms, twenty per cent of the value of the total
performance for which the buyer is obligated under the contract or
$500, whichever is smaller.
3) The buyer's right to restitution under subsection (2) is subject to offset to
the extent that the seller establishes
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this Article other
than subsection (1), and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer directly or
indirectly by reason of the contract.
4) Where a seller has received payment in goods their reasonable value or the
proceeds of their resale shall be treated as payments for the purposes of sub.
section (2) ; but if the seller has notice of the buyer's breach before reselling goods
received in part performance, his resale is subject to the conditions laid down in
this Article on resale by an aggrieved seller (Section 2-706).
5. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. L~w § 39 (McKinney 1951) provides that personal property
includes:
[C]hattels, money, things in action, and all written instruments themselves, as
distinguished from the rights or interests to which they relate, by which any right,
interest, lien or incumbrance in, to or upon property, or any debt or financial ob-
ligation is created, acknowledged, evidenced . . . wholly or in part, and every-
thing, except real property, which may be the subject of ownership.
6. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 2 (McKinney 1968).
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in consequence of the buyer's breach.7 If the action is one in-
volving real property, a seller may retain a wilfully defaulting-
buyer's down payment even though the seller resells the property
for a sum equal to or greater than the contract price.8
In determining the measure of damages, the court will look
to the parties' intention9 in forming the contract as well as any
statutory or decisional guidelines. Absent a liquidated damages
clause'0 or other similar contractual provision," the retention of
7. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-706. Contra, Waldman v. Greenberg, 265 App. Div. 827, 37 N.Y.S.
2d 565 (2d Dep't 1942). In a buyer's action to recover a payment made under a contract
for the purchase of certain crockery and dishware, the court held that since the buyer had
willfully breached, he was not entitled to recover any of the money paid. "The monies
characterized as a 'deposit' were, as the terms of the contract show, a payment on account
of the purchase price. Such monies cannot be recovered where the purchaser has breached
the contract." Id. at 828, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 566. It should be noted that Waldman is ap-
parently superseded by section 2-706.
8. Silverstein v. United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n, 17 App. Div. 2d 160, 282 N.Y.2d 968
(1st Dep't 1962). In an action to recover the sum paid to the vendor in connection with
a contract for the purchase of certain realty by the plaintiff-vendees, the vendor was en-
titled to retain the deposit if, upon a retrial of the facts, it was found that the sum was a
down payment. The court stated: "Where the payment by a vendee was a down payment
on the purchase price and not merely made as a binder for a future contract . . . and
he willfully defaults under his contract, it is settled in this state that he may not in law or
in equity recover his down payment even though the vendor resells the premises for a
sum equal to or greater than the contract price." Id. at 164-65, 282 N.Y.S. 2d at 972-73. But
see Freedman v. Rector, 87 Cal. 2d 16, 280 P.2d 629 (1951) in which a defaulting buyer
was held to be entitled to return of his deposit because the seller had resold the property
for a sum above the contract price. This decision must, however, be weighed in light of
the fact that many land purchase contracts in California are, unlike in New York, land
installment contracts. See Warren, California Installment Land Sales Contracts: A Time
for Reform, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 608 (1962).
9. Kasen v. Morrell, 6 App. Div. 2d 816, 175 N.Y.S.2d 815 (2d Dep't 1958) ; Halperin
v. McCrory Stores Corp., 207 App. Div. 448, 202 N.Y.S. 885 (2d Dep't 192).
10. The term "liquidated damages" describes the compensation which the parties to
a contract agree in advance is to be paid to one of the parties in satisfaction of the loss or
injury which will follow from a breach of the contract by the other party and will be
considered a penalty unless two criteria are met: (1) the amount must be reasonable and
the actual damages in case of a breach must not be readily ascertainable (Wirth & Harnid
Fair Booking, Inc. v. Wirth, 265 N.Y. 214, 192 N.E. 297 (194)); (2) liquidated damages
exist only by virtue of an express agreement between the parties (Winkleman v. Winkle-
man, 208 App. Div. 68, 203 N.Y.S. 63 (Ist Dep't 1924) ). See also Kaplan v. Scheiner, I App.
Div. 2d 829, 149 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1st Dep't 1956). This case involved an action against the
vendors on a contract for a deed which provided that time was of the essence. If on the
closing date the vendee refused to perform, the amount paid on account would be forfeited
as liquidated damages. The court held that contract provisions for liquidated damages did
not in any way weaken the vendor's right to retain such part payment. The court reasoned:
"LW]hen the purchaser has been unready or unwilling to perform, he is in default and
may not be permitted to recover any part payment given on account of the purchase
price."' Id. at 330, 149 N.YS.2d at 869-70.
11. The parties, of course, have the right to insert any stipulation to which they
might agree, providing it is not unconscionable or contrary to public policy. 879 Madison
Ave., Inc. v. Stuyvesant Co., 242 App. Div. 567, 275 N.Y.S. 953 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 268 N.Y.
576, 198 N.E. 412 (1934).
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the deposit may assume the appearance of a forfeiture. As a result,
there has been a reluctance to enforce forfeiture clauses, 2 save in
the instance of a breach of contract relating to realty. Under the
New York Sales of Goods Act of 191113 a seller of personalty was
deprived of his former common law right to sue a defaulting buyer
for the agreed upon purchase price; rather, he could maintain an
action only for those damages directly and naturally resulting from
the buyer's breach.14 In 1952, this statute was superseded by sec-
tion 145 of the Personal Property Law which similarly provided
that in the absence of a liquidated damages clause, the seller was
restricted to his actual damages in the case of a breach by the
buyer.15 Thus, in determining the measure of damages in the in-
stant case, it became essential to consider whether an interest in
a cooperative apartment, namely a proprietary lease, constituted
personalty or realty.
A cooperative apartment is a multi-unit dwelling in which
each resident has both an interest in the entity (often a corpora-
tion) which owns the building and a lease entitling him to occupy
a particular apartment within the building. This right to occupy is
embodied in a "proprietary" lease between the corporate landlord
and the tenant shareholder. 6 The tenancy has additional char-
acteristics: for example, the tenant has a vote in deciding how the
cooperative is to be run; he pays property taxes via his monthly
carrying charges; and he depends upon the financial solvency of the
12. In a replevin action to recover possession of plaintiff's automobile, the court
held that forfeitures are not favored in law, and that statutes designed to relieve the rigors
of forfeitures are looked upon favorably and construed liberally by the courts. Cortes v.
Rosetti, 38 Misc. 2d 250, 235 N.Y.S.2d 403 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1962). For the realty
concept, in which forfeiture of a down payment is permitted, see Beveridge v. West Side
Constr. Co., 130 App. Div. 139, 114 N.Y.S. 521 (1st Dep't 1909).
13. [1911] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 571.
14. [1911] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 571, § 145(2) provided:
The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in
the ordinary course of events, from the buyer's breach of contract.
15. [1952] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 823, § 1 provided:
1. Where the buyer has defaulted by failing to pay money or transfer goods as
required of him by the contract of sale but has made payments . . . in part
performance of the contract, and the seller fails or refuses to deliver the goods
which he had contracted to deliver and is justified therein by the buyer's de.
fault, the buyer is entitled to that amount, if any, by which the payments he
has made . . . exceeds
(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by the terms of a clause, if
any, in the contract, which constitutes a reasonable liquidation in
advance of the seller's anticipated damages ....
16. C. BERcER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND UsE 172-75 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BERr.Ln].
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whole project to render his leasehold secure. There has been much
confusion in New York, however, over the nature of the interest
which the tenant obtains. The tenant has been referred to as being
an "owner,"'1 "partner,"' 8 and "proprietary lessee.""' At least for
purposes regarding the return of a down payment,20 New York de-
cisional law has established that a lease is personal property.
2'
However, in the case of a cooperative apartment, the court must
also determine the nature of the stock interest which the tenant-
shareholder acquires.
Under the Sales of Goods Act,2 a sale of corporate stock was
held to be a sale of "goods." A leading case under this statute,
Agar v. Orda,23 involved a seller's action to recover the agreed upon
purchase price for 200 shares of stock from a defaulting buyer. The
Supreme Court of New York County noted the confusion regard-
ing the nature of the shares of stock,24 and held that shares of stock
were "goods" within the meaning of the Sales Act:
Although the historical correctness of this rule may be chal-
lenged, it reflects a practical rather than a legalistic concep-
17. 1165 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Alger, 288 N.Y. 67, 41 N.E.2d 461 (1942).
18. The court in one instance concluded that the relationship between the tenant-
owners of a cooperative apartment was in effect "a partnership for the mutual benefit of
the cooperative owners expressed in corporate terms." Tompkins v. Hale, 172 Misc. 1071. 1073,
15 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 860, 20 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Ist Dep't),
aff'd, 284 N.Y. 675, 30 N.E.2d 721 (1940).
19. People ex rel. McGoldrick v. Sterling, 283 App. Div. 88, 126 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1st
Dep't 1953).
20. See Silverstein v. United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n, 17 App. Div. 2d 160, 232 N.Y.S.2d
968 (1st Dep't 1962) (discussed supra note 8) ; accord, Arroyo v. Patayne Estates, Inc., 25
App. Div. 2d 424, 266 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st Dep't 1966), citing Silverstein v. United Cerebral
Palsy Ass'n, supra.
21. A lease, as an estate for years, has been held to constitute personalty in cases
involving: tax assessments (Oak Island Beach Ass'n v. Mascari, 47 Misc. 2d 21, 261 N.Y.S.2d
982 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 496. 267 N.Y.S.2d 192 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 18
N.Y.2d 861, 222 N.E.2d 735, 276 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1966)); right of transit and access through
leased premises (Nemmer Furniture Co. v. Select Furniture Co., 25 Misc. 2d 895, 208
N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. 1960)); and damages suffered by a change in the grade of an
approach to a bridge (Ehrsam v. City of Utica, 37 App. Div. 272, 55 N.YS. 942 (4th Dep't
1899)). The interest of a tenant of real property under a lease is not real property, but a
chattel real, which is personal property. Fort Hamilton Manor, Inc. v. Boyland, 4 N.Y.2d
192, 149 N.E.2d 856, 173 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1958). But see N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 290(1)
(McKinney 1968) which treats leases, except those for a term not exceeding three years, as
real property for recording purposes.
22. [1911] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 571.
23. 144 Misc. 149, 258 N.Y.S. 274 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 239 App. Div. 827, 264 N.Y.S.
939 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934).
24. "The question whether shares of stock are 'goods' within the meaning of the
Sales Act has long been the subject of controversy." Id. at 152, 258 N.Y.S. at 276.
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tion of the status of shares of corporate stock, and tends to con-
form to the needs of modern business practice.25
Even though the Personal Property Law replaced the Sales of
Goods Act in 1952, the reasoning of Agar was reiterated in subse-
quent cases. In 1956, the court in Rosenzweig v. Salkindc2 held that
"shares of stock are 'goods' within the provisions of the Personal
Property Law."'2 7 Although the Personal Property Law was in turn
superseded by the U.C.C. in 1962, its spirit still persisted in the
Code. Two U.C.C. provisions are relevant in determining the na-
ture of the tenant's stock. Section 2-105 deals with the definition
of goods,28 and section 8-102 defines "investment securities. '2 If
the tenant's interest is defined as "goods," then the damage formula
will be within'article 2 and the deposit amount will be recover-
able, minus any damages actually suffered by the seller. 0 If the in-
terest is seen as being within the definition of "investment secur-
ities," then it will be excluded from article 2,81 and the damage
formula of section 2-718 will not apply. 2
25. Id. at 154, 258 N.Y.S. at 278.
26. 6 Misc. 2d 284, 158 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1956). In this case, plaintiff seller sued
defendant buyer to recover the sum of $12,500 which the defendant had contracted to pay
the plaintiff as the purchase price for 50 shares of common stock in Fair Maid Cottons,
[nc. The court held for the plaintiff on the grounds that he was frustrated from reselling
the stock since no ready open market existed.
27. Id. at 287, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 524. See also Kukoff v. Muss, 6 Misc. 2d 807, 810, 160
N.YS.2d 156, 159 (Sup. Ct. 1957) in which the court held "that corporate stock partakes
of the nature of goods has been settled by the holding in Agar v. Orda.
28. N.Y. U.C.C. art. 2, § 2-105 (1) (text quoted supra note 3).
29. N.Y. U.C.C. art. 8, § 8-102 defines an investment security as an instrument which:
i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or
commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a
medium for investment; and
iii) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class
or series of instruments; and
iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an
enterprise or evidences an obligation of the issuer.
30. N.Y. U.C.C. art. 2, § 2-718 (text quoted supra note 4).
31. See text quoted supra note 3.
32. At common law, a seller has three remedies for a buyer's breach of a contract to
purchase specified securities. A seller may treat the stock as belonging to the buyer, and
recover the contract price; he may resell the stock as an agent of the buyer and recover the
difference between the contract price and the net amount received on resale; or he may
keep the shares of stock and recover as damages the difference between the contract price
and the value of the stock at the time the buyer should have accepted. Mason v. Decker,
72 N.Y. 595 (1878). See also Henry Glass & Co. v. Misroch, 239 N.Y. 475, 147 N.E. 71 (1925) ;
D'Aprile v. Turner-Looker Co., 239 N.Y. 427, 147 N.E. 15 (1925). N.Y. U.C.C. art. 8, § 8-107
provides that where a security has been delivered or tendered to a purchaser pursuant to
a contract and the purchaser wrongfully defaults, the seller may recover the agreed upon
price of the security. See also Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1932) (a seller
may be entitled to recover damages from one who agrees to buy and then repudiates).
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In the New York annotations to section 2-105, 3 the definition
of "goods" is seen as being compatible with the prior statutes. As
has been shown, under the previously applicable Sales of Goods
Act and the Personal Property Law, both a lease and corporate
stock were considered personalty.3 4 If the Code is to be interpreted
consistently with these prior statutes, then the same classifica-
tions should continue to apply. This reasoning seems to be sup-
ported by Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp.," a 1964 case decided
after the enactment of the U.C.C. In that case, stockholders of a
cooperative apartment corporation brought an action against the
corporation to recover damages arising from the corporation's
failure to repair certain structural defects. The court held for the
stockholders regarding the corporate landlord's liability for
repairs. In reaching this decision, the City Court of New York
stated:
An estate measured by a definite number of years, such as a
leasehold of a co-operative apartment, is personalty and not
realty... and the fact that stock ownership is prerequisite to the
procurement of the lease does not affect the legal classification
of these assets as personal property .. . .6
Both Susskind and a 1968 case, Carden Hall, Inc. v. George,
37
hold that the relationship between stockholder and corporation in
a cooperative apartment situation is that of tenant and landlord.
Since this means that the parties are governed by a lease agree-
ment, the lease being personal property, the rule of damages re-
garding personal property will apply. Under the reasoning of
Susskind, this is possible since "stock ownership... does not affect
the legal classification of [the lease interest] as personal property. ' 3
Moreover, the securities would be considered "goods" within sec-
tion 2-105 of the U.C.C.,29 invoking the damage remedy of section
33. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-105, annot. 1.
34. Cases cited supra notes 20, 25, 27.
35. 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1964).
36. Id. at 591, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
37. 56 Misc. 2d 865, 290 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1968). In this action, a cooperative
housing development sought to compel a tenant to remove a dishwasher from his apartment
in accordance with a recently promulgated rule of the cooperative. The court held that the
cooperative failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that it had the right, pursuant to
the occupancy agreement, to subsequently modify the agreement and rescind the tenant's
right to use the washing machine.
38. Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 591, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321, 326 (New
York City Civ. Ct. 1964).
39. Text quoted supra note 3.
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2-718.40 However, in the Official Comment to section 8-1024' the
definition of "security" is offered as being "functional rather than
formal." It would seem that the stock acquired in a cooperative
apartment is more functionally related to leasehold interests
than to investment securities,42 with the legislative intent requiring
that the stock be classified in light of such leasehold interests.
Thus, even if the stock is considered as an investment security, a
functional interpretation would seem to dictate that since the
leasehold is the principal interest with which the parties are con-
cerned, it should take precedence over the securities interest. In
either case, the leasehold is the controlling interest; it is personal
property,43 and damages must be awarded accordingly.
The court in the instant case viewed the principal issue as
"whether or not the underlying sale of the stock and proprietary
lease in the co-operative apartment was one of realty or person-
alty.' 44 The classification of the cooperator's interest was necessary
so that the proper measure of damages would be applied.4 The
majority, speaking through Justice Murphy, noted the lack of
appellate decisions relating to this problem, save Kaplan v.
Scheiner. 46 They distinguished that precedent since the contract in
that case, unlike the present situation, contained a liquidated dam-
ages clause. Moreover, since that case was decided in 1956, prior
to the enactment of the U.C.C., it was not seen as controlling. The
40. Text quoted supra note 4. A New York court evidenced the problem when it
said: "The term 'security' has no exactly defined legal definition." In re Waldstein, 160
Misc. 763, 766, 291 N.Y.S. 697, 700 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
41. The official comments upon the Uniform Commercial Code are set forth in
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 62Y., Part 1, with special
reference to pages 96-97 which are pertinent to the case at bar read as follows:
'Investment securities' are expressly excluded from the coverage of this
Article. It is not intended by this exclusion, however, to prevent the
application of a particular section of this Article by analogy to securities
.. .when the reason of that section makes such application sensible
and the situation involved is not covered by the Article of this Act deal-
ing specifically with such securities (Article 8).
Instant case at 170, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
42. But see Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws,
71 COLUm. L. REv. 118 (1971) for the need to consider the interest in cooperative housing
as "securities" on a federal level.
43. See cases cited supra notes 19-20.
44. Instant case at 168, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
45. Id.
46. 1 App. Div. 2d 329, 149 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Ist Dep't 1956).
47. Instant case at 168, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 41. See supra note 10.
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court cited a number of cases, 8 including Agar v. Orda,9 in which
the term "goods" was held to include stock certificates. The major-
ity compared the definition of "goods" under the Personal Pro-
perty Law and the U.C.C., and concluded that they are substan-
tially similar. ° The court recognized that U.C.C. section 2-105
excludes "investment securities," 51 but reasoned that this exclusion
was an attempt to make the provisions of article 2 and article 8
"harmonious rather than mutually exclusive. 5 2 The court quoted
the Official Comments to article 2 and the definition of investment
securities in section 8-10213 of the U.C.C. and reasoned that since
cooperative apartment stock does not fall within this definition,
article 2 must, perforce, apply.54 The court then determined that
the parties originally intended the contract as one for the sale of
personalty.55 The opinion cited Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp.5
and reasoned that a proprietary lease is no different than any other
type of lease;57 it is personal property. It further reasoned that co-
48. Ballentine v. Ferretti, 255 App. Div. 606, 8 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Ist Dep't 1938);
Kukoff v. Muss, 6 Misc. 2d 807, 160 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Rosenzweig v. Salkind,
6 Misc. 2d 284, 158 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1956); In re Galewitz, 206 Misc. 218, 132
N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sur. Ct. 1954); Coyne v. Chatham Phoenix Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 153
Misc. 656, 281 N.Y.S. 271 (New York City Ct. 1935).
49. 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934).
50. Instant case at 170, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
51. See text quoted supra notes 3 & 29.
52. Instant case at 170, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 43. The court further stated:
We believe that even if Article 8 is deemed to apply to cooperative apartment
stock, that Article 8 is to be read in conjunction with Article 2, and where Article
8 is silent, Article 2 is applicable.
Id.
53. Id. See text quoted supra note 29.
54. It would be extremely illogical to contend that the legislature intended to
turn the clock back with respect to the broad range of stock certificates covered
by Article 8 to the situation which prevailed when the rights of the parties were
governed by the common law as it existed in this State prior to the enforcement
of the Sales of Goods Act.
Instant case at 171, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
55. The contract contains none of the classic clauses that are found within the
standard real estate contracts. No questions relating to the marketability of the
property are set forth within the contract. Nor are there provisions for the
execution or delivery of a deed, or a provision for title insurance. In addition,
there is no provision for payment by the seller, nor does the defendant claim that
it paid to the City of New York any New York City Real Property Transfer Tax.
There was no provision for payment of revenue stamps on any instrument of any
kind. As a matter of fact, the contract in question called for the payment of the
required stock transfer stamps, rather than any revenue stamps.
Id. at 171-72, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
56. 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1964).
57. Instant case at 172, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
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operative apartment stock is just like any other stock in a corpora-
tion owning real estate. The majority concluded that the shares in
a cooperative apartment are "goods" within article 2 of the
U.C.C., 58 and since the law frowns upon forfeiture,"9 the deposit
made under the contract should be disposed of in accordance with
section 2-718 of the U.C.C.
Justices Eager and Steuer dissented in an opinion filed by
Justice Steuer. The dissent would have affirmed the judgment
directed by special term.60 Like the majority, the dissent recognized
the necessity of classifying the transaction as one involving per-
sonalty or realty.6' The dissent reasoned, however, that the inherent
nature of the property right was controlling, 2 and since "the
dominant characteristic of such shares [in a cooperative] is the right
to a proprietary lease, 013 they are distinguishable from ordinary
corporate stock ownership. The dissent further noted that while
the owner did not acquire a fee in the apartment, he possessed so
many of the rights and obligations peculiar to fee ownership 4 that
his status is for practical purposes indistinguishable. The dissent
concluded:
However, even if the shares be regarded as personalty under
the common law of this state, the deposit is not recoverable
[citations omitted]. It is claimed that this has been superseded
by statute, the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2. That at-
58. Id.
59. Id. at 168, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
60. Id. at 173, 323 N.Y.$.2d at 45.
61. Id.
62. Cooperative apartments made their appearance long after classic distinctions
between realty and personalty were formulated, and the guidlines to classification
should be established by the inherent nature of the property right rather than
mere superficial resemblances to other forms.
Id.
63. Id.
64. The dissent lists the following: The Statute of Frauds applicable to real estate
transactions applies to sales of cooperative stock (Frank v. Rubin, 59 Misc. 2d 796, 300
N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1969)); the stock has been treated as realty in determining the
priority of judgment and tax liens (Lacaille v. Feldman, 44 Misc. 2d 370, 253 N.Y.S.2d 937
(Sup. Ct. 1964)); the shareholder has been authorized to bring summary eviction pro-
ceedings (Curtis v. LeMay, 186 Misc. 853, 60 N.Y.S.2d 768 (New York City Mun. Ct.
1945)); Federal and New York State income tax laws give the same privileges to co-
operative share owners as they do to fee owners in many respects (INT. Ray. CODE of
1954, §§ 121 (a), (d) (3), 216, 1034 and N.Y. TAx LAw § 360 (12)). "In addition, alien-
ability, liability for maintenance and repairs, as well as the privileges of making interior
alterations, give a popular recognition to the status of realty quite in accord with the
decisional law which treats this type of property as realty." Instant case at 173, 323
N.Y.S.2d at 46.
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tide has no application. It refers to 'goods' which by defini-
tion (§2-105) excludes 'investment securities and things in
action.' If this sale is regarded as a sale of the stock, it is ex-
cluded as a sale of an investment security; if it be regarded as
a sale of the proprietary lease, with the stock being only incident-
al, it is excluded as the lease is plainly a thing in action. The
article having no application, the common-law rule continues.65
There has been an appreciable rise in the use of cooperative
apartments since the end of World War II.
Growing urban populations created housing problems, especial-
ly for middle and lower income families. State and federal
legislation was passed to encourage the building of apartments;
cooperative apartment corporations shared in the benefits and
many were built with financial support of the FHA:.66
Due to this increase in the number of cooperative housing devel-
opments, coupled with the existing uncertainties as to the nature
of the interest which the tenant obtains, it seems likely that in-
creased litigation will ensue. The instant case exemplifies the
manner in which these uncertainties may lead to more litigation.
It appears that the points of disagreement stated by the dissent
6 7
are not points which are normally arguable and open to such
dichotomous opinions, at least in light of applicable New York
law. 8 Rather they would appear to be fundamental to the under-
standing and adjudication of an interest in a cooperative apart-
ment. The instant case illustrates the inherent element of con-
fusion regarding the proper treatment of the interest obtained in
a cooperative apartment. In this connection, several considerations
seem relevant. The cooperative apartment interest has character-
istics similar to three other common housing interests: (1) the
fee simple ownership of a single house; (2) the landlord-tenant
65. Instant case at 174, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
66. Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities, 45 B.U.L. REV. 465,
466 (1965).
67. The dissent in the instant case rested on five grounds:
1) interpreting the nature of the interest conveyed by looking to its substantive
implications;
2) considering a lease for years as realty;
3) holding the sale of stock in a cooperative as a sale of investment securities;
4) holding a lease as a thing in action; and
5) considering the deposit as forfeited under the common law of the state even
if the sale involved personalty.
Instant case at 173-75, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 46-47.
68. See cases cited supra notes 20 and 21.
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relationship; and (3) the condominium. 9 In fee simple ownership,
an individual receives the title to a house and a deed to the land
upon which it is built; he pays taxes on his fee and usually must
make mortgage payments. In the landlord-tenant form of owner-
ship, the tenant-lessee has no fee ownership but only a lease which
entitles him to occupy a particular space in a building for a speci-
fied time at a specified rent. Unlike the fee owner, the lessee ob-
tains no real property interest in his dwelling.70 In a condominum,
the units are individually owned in fee simple, while the common
elements are owned in fee simple in undivided percentages speci-
fied in the declaration of the condominium.7 1 The real estate
taxes and mortgage fees paid by the unit owner are deductible
for federal tax purposes, just as they are in the case of fee simple
ownership of a single home. 2 An owner of a condominium unit
owns real property." On the other hand, one authority has argued
that a
tenant-cooperator buys shares of stock in a corporation (choses
in action-personal property) and obtains a lease to an apart-
ment (which is a contract for the 'use' of real property, but
not a real property interest itself) .... The ownership of stock
and a contract of lease are not real property interests, even
though the courts have, in several instances, chosen to ignore
this simple fact.74
It seems, therefore, that the court in the instant case agrees that
the substantial legal difference between the two closely analogous
forms of multi-unit dwelling-condominium and cooperative-is
that the interest in the former is realty, and the interest in the lat-
ter is personalty. The tenant-cooperator is not an "owner" of the
apartment, but rather an owner of stock by which he gains the
"right" to occupy a specific place for a specific time at a determinable
69. P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CooPERATIVE HoUSINc. LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02. "at 1.3
to 1-6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN & RFSKIN].
70. See cases cited supra note 21.
71. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(5), (7), 339-i (McKinney 1968). See also
ROHAN & RESKrN § 1.02 (3), at 1-5.
72. RoHAN & REsKiN § 1.02 (3), at 1-5.
73. Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (New York
City CiV. Ct. 1964). See also N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-g (McKinney 1968); ROHAN F
RESKIN § 1.03, at 1-7.
74. ROHAN & RESKIN § 1.03, at 1-7.
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price-the same as any other leaseholder.75 This is the pivotal distinc-
tion upon which the majority in the instant case relied.7, To reach
this result, the court indulged in an equation: proprietary lease (per-
sonalty) plus cooperative stock (personalty) equals the interest ob-
tained in a cooperative apartment (also personalty). 77 However, was
this equation correct, or did the court merely adopt it as a way to
facilitate disposing of that issue? To answer this question, it is first
necessary to determine the validity of the principal precedents upon
which the majority relied: Agar v. Orda,78 and Susskind v. 1136
Tenants Corp.76 Agar dealt with a sale of corporate stock, holding
the sale of such stock to be a sale of personalty for purposes regarding
the return of a down payment. While this precedent may be ger-
mane in determining the nature of the stock interest conveyed, it is
in no way related to any sort of lease interest. The court uses
Agar to establish the nature of the stock in a cooperative;80 how-
ever, Agar does not deal with cooperative stock. The other chief
precedent, Susskind, seems at first glance to be very close in point
to the instant case. It dealt with cooperative apartments, but in
a context relating to liability for repairs of the apartments. True,
Susskind holds that a leasehold in a cooperative apartment is per-
sonalty;8' that case also stated that stock ownership does not affect
the legal classification of such interest as personal property.8 2 How-
ever, the authorities which the Susskind court cited for this latter
proposition are section 202 (1) (8) of the Surrogate's Court Act
and In re Miller's Estate.3 The cited section of the Surrogate's
75. 1165 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Alger, 288 N.Y. 67, 41 N.E.2d 461 (1942). See also
ROHAN & R.SKIN § 2.02 (5) (g) , at 2-21.
76. Instant case at 172, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
77. It does not appear that the pairing of the two together does anything to
create a new classification of real estate.
Id.
78. 144 Misc. 149, 258 N.Y.S. 274 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 239 App. Div. 827, 264
N.Y.S. 939 (Ist Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934).
79. 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1964).
80. Instant case at 169, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
81. 43 Misc. 2d at 591,251 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
82. Id.
83. 205 Misc. 770, 130 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sur. Ct. 1954). This case involved the construc-
tion of a will. The court held the cooperative apartment lease and stock constituted
personalty, and thus did not pass by devise of the real estate owned by the deceased.
The court further stated that "the fact that stock ownership is prerequisite to the pro-
curement of the lease would not seem to affect the legal dassification of these assets."
Id. at 771, 130 N.Y.S.2d at 296. It thus appears that the Miller court, as the Susskind and
Silverman courts, found no problem in coupling the lease and stock interests and arriving
at another personalty interest as the result.
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Court Act has been replaced by section 13-1.1 of the New York
Estates, Powers and Trusts Law.84 Both this section and Miller deal
with a lease interest for purposes of administering an estate. In
fact the court in the instant case refers to these same authorities in
supporting this proposition." While the authorities may be helpful
in supporting the concept of a lease as personalty, and while it is
true that the Surrogate's Court in Miller held a cooperative lease
interest as personalty, it is questionable whether these authorities
constitute strong precedent for the equation in the instant case.
The result, however, would have been different had the case
involved a condominium. As noted above, the interest in a
condominium is a fee ownership, i.e., realty.88 The court, if it had
applied its formalistic reasoning, would have no choice but to re-
solve the case differently. Since the condominium owner has a
fee estate in the space which he occupies, the rules regarding realty
damages would apply. Thus the dichotomy between condominium
and cooperative would be maintained. 7 Even though the condo-
minium seems to be the more desirable alternative, 8 the coopera-
tive doggedly retains its place in the legal system of the state.
Whether or not the above distinction makes any practical
sense is questionable. For example, tenants in a cooperative and
owners of condominium units are given the same rights regarding
84. N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 13-1.1 (a) (1) (McKinney 1967) provides:
(a) For purposes of the administration of an estate, the following assets of the
decedent are personal property ...
(1) Estates for years in real property ....
85. Instant case at 171, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
86. See Note, Condominium: A Reconciliation of Competing Interests?, 18 VAND. L.
Rav. 1773, 1778 (1965).
87. This distinction is evidenced even in New York statutory provisions. Article 9-B
of the Real Property Law (McKinney 1968) is entitled the "Condominium Act," while
cooperative corporations seem to fall within Article 2 of the Cooperative Corporations Law
(McKinney 1951). See also ROHAN & REsKiN § 3.02, at 3-8 to 8-5.
88. The cooperative arrangement appears to be less desirable than the condominium
because of certain financial aspects. For example, for purposes of mortgage financing and
real property taxation, the cooperator's "estate" lacks sufficient "personality" to support his
individual 'obligation. The cooperative venture also requires that the tenants collectively
meet the tax and debt obligations on their property. Refinancing is not possible unless
all cooperators agree to refinance the blanket debts (BERoER at 173). For a broader
perspective, see Berger, The Condominium-Cooperative Comparison, 11 PRAc. LAW. 87
(1965). See generally Comment, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle.Income Coopera.
tive Apartments, 68 YALE L.J. 542 (1959); Note, The Cooperative Apartment in Govern.
ment-Assisted Low-Middle Income Housing, 111 U. PA. L. Rv. 638 (1968); Note, Condo.
miniums: Incorporation of the Common Elements-A Proposal, 28 VAND. L. REV. 821
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federal tax deductions.8 9 New York provides that a tenant share-
holder may deduct the amount he paid to the corporation for real
estate taxes under his personal income deductions.10 The con-
dominium unit owner's parcel, not including any personal pro-
perty, is deemed to be subject to special assessment and taxation.91
For tax purposes, then, the tenant shareholder is in much the same
position as the fee owner. Both the cooperative and condominum
are also entitled to FHA mortgage insurance. 2 A cooperative apart-
ment corporation is run by a board of directors which either man-
ages the apartment building directly or selects a manager. The
operation of the building is governed by the duly adopted rules
and regulations which are designed for securing the greatest good
for the benefit of the members 3 In like manner, the condominium
is usually run by a manager appointed by the board of directors.
The unit owner must comply with the rules and regulations which
the management adopts so as not to encroach upon the rights of
other unit owners 4 Moreover, there may be a provision in the
cooperator's proprietary lease which prohibits assignment of the
lease and transfer of the corporate stock unless the board of dir-
89. Tenants in a cooperative are allowed to deduct their proportionate share of the
corporation's real estate taxes; INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 216. Condominium apartment
owners are entitled to deduct their own share of real estate taxes; Rev. Rul. 64-31, 1964-1
CuM. BULL. 300.
90. N.Y. TAX LAW, § 360 (12) (McKinney 1966) provides that in computing net
income, there shall be allowed as deductions:
In the case of a tenant-stockholder, amounts, not otherwise deductible, paid or
accrued to a cooperative apartment corporation within the taxable year, if such
amounts represent that proportion of the real estate taxes on the apartment
building and the land on which it is situated, paid or incurred by the corporation
and allowable as deductions for income tax purposes, or of the interest paid or
incurred by the corporation on its indebtedness contracted in the acquisition,
construction, alteration, rehabilitation, or maintenance of such apartment building
or in the acquisition of the land on which the building is located, which the
stock of the corporation owned by the tenant-stockholder is of the total outstand-
ing stock of the corporation, including that held by the corporation.
It is to be noted that under this provision, a cooperative apartment corporation is one
in which eighty per cent or more of the gross income is derived from the tenant-
stockholders.
91. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-y (McKinney 1968).
92. 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (1950); 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1961).
93. Forest Park Cooperative v. Hellman, 2 Misc. 2d 183, 152 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct.
1956); Vernon Manor Co-operative Apartments v. Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 178 N.Y.S.2d
895 (Westchester County Ct. 1958).
94. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAiw § 339-i (4) (McKinney 1968).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ectors or a stipulated proportion of the other tenants agree. 5 The
fee owner in the condominium may sell, rent, exchange, or mort-
gage his unit independently of his neighbors unless the bylaws pro-
vide otherwise. 6 In a cooperative, the tenant-stockholder is usually
bound by his lease agreement to pay his proportionate share of the
maintenance costs of the property, costs which are chargeable in
common to all the tenant-stockholdersY7 In like manner, the unit
owner in a condominium is charged for the common expenses"s
according to his respective common interest.
In view of these similarities, the distinction between coopera-
tive and condominium may be viewed as an unnecessary bifurca-
tion of the law. 9 On the other hand, this distinction may be merely
an attempt by the judiciary to "pigeonhole" the interest obtained
in a multi-unit dwelling by relating it to the artificial classification
of such dwelling. If the latter is the case, then the courts would be
well advised to take notice of the fact that more litigation is
imminent. The housing situation is in a state of flux, with dwell-
ings going from single house to apartment to cooperative to con-
dominium to unlimited future possibilities. It is this flux which
makes rigid classification impractical as new and different housing
forms such as mobile homes and movable modular arrangements
become more widely used. These will pose additional problems
for the courts to solve. For example, what is the nature of the
interest which one possesses in a mobile home? Presumably this
type of housing will be moved from lot to lot. It therefore seems
unlikely that the mobile home resident will seek fee ownership
95. Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d
417 (Ist Dep't 1939); Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853, 60 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct.
1945). It should be noted, however, that as a practical matter, it is usually easier for a
condominium unit owner to transfer his property independently, than it is for a coopera-
tive shareholder to gain the requisite consent of his fellow shareholders needed for transfer.
96. The bylaws may govern the alienation of the units, except that there shall be no
provision restricting alienation because of race, creed, color, or national origin. N.Y.
RFAL PROP. LAW § 339-v (2) (a) (McKinney 1968).
97. Brigham Park Co-operative Apts. v. Lieberman, 158 N.Y.S.2d 135 (N.Y. City
Mun. Ct. 1956).
98. Common expenses include the expenses incident to the operation of the property
and all others designated common expenses by the Condominium Act or the bylaws. N.Y.
R.AL PROP. LAw § 339-e (4) (McKinney 1968).
99. At least one writer seems to view the distinction as unnecessary. See Wisner,
Financing the Condominium in New York: The Conventional Mortgage, 31 ALBANY L.
REv. 32, 33 (1967): "Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp. represents the sum total of New
York and, perhaps, American case law on condominiums .... " The author must have
dispensed with the distinction, for Susskind dealt with a cooperative apartment rather
than a condominium.
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in the space in which he parks his trailer. On the other hand, it
seems logical to assume that the vast majority of people living in
this manner will own the mobile home. It follows that, since they
are renting a space to occupy, the logic of the instant case would
dictate that they would be considered tenants, with the landlord-
tenant concepts applying. 10 But unlike the typical tenant, the
trailer resident usually owns his "apartment"; in this respect he is
similar to a condominium unit owner. Strict classification does
not lend itself to situations which so vary from the applied analogy.
Thus, the "pigeonholing" evidenced in the instant case may not
be flexible enough to meet similar future variations. What of the
future, when modules come into use? These residences may con-
ceivably be "plugged in" to a space in a modular tower. Here the
modular owner may seek permanent fee-type rights to his space.
The situation would be analogous to a condominium, with realty
concepts applicable. This is so because of the ownership of both
the module and the space by the resident. However, if the module
owner is the vagabond type, he may wish only to rent the space. In
such cases, it seems as though he becomes a tenant, rather than an
owner (as regards the space), and is in a position similar to the
present day mobile home owner, at least as far as the concepts
espoused in the instant case are concerned. 10 1 The same difficulty
regarding adequate classification of his interest will once again be
evidenced.
The distinction between realty and personalty will undoubt-
edly continue to have significance in the future. Legal precedent
dictates that there be different damage remedies for these different
types of property. As desirable as this concept may be in a case in-
100. Contra, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LA-w § 102 (12) (g) (McKinney 1960):
12. 'Real property,' 'property' or 'land' mean and include:
. i • •
(g) Forms of housing adaptable to motivation by a power connected thereto,
commonly called 'trailers' or 'mobile homes'....
But see Albany Discount Corp. v. Mohawk Nat'l Bank of Schenectady, 28 N.Y.2d 222, 269
N.E.2d 809, 321 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1971) in which a mobile home was held to be a motor
vehicle (personalty) for purposes of article 9 of the U.C.C. relating to the necessity of
filing to perfect a security interest in a motor vehicle required to be licensed or registered
in the state.
101. The court in the principal case declined to consider the interest in a cooperative
as being controlled by the way in which it is classified for tax purposes (see statutes cited
supra notes 90-92). Rather it concentrated on the broader aspects of lease and stock
interests. It therefore seems logical to conclude that it would disregard any similar future
provisions (see discussion supra note 100) and would look again to the broader character-
istics of a mobile or modular interest.
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volving the traditional classifications of realty or personalty, its
utility breaks down when it becomes necessary to consider a com-
bined classification. If an individual owning his residential module
rents a space in which to place it, should he be treated as a ten-
ant because he is renting a space, or should he be considered a fee
owner because he owns his "apartment"? Thus, the distinction
between real and personal interests as regarding damages in the
instant case becomes more and more difficult to apply. Rather than
merely focusing on the legal differences and similarities, the courts
should move away from relying on formalistic distinctions, and
focus instead on the practical aspects of a given interest.
STANLEY W. VALKOSKY, JR.
TORTS-SPECIFIC INTENT TO INDEMNIFY INDEMNITEE FOR
His ACTIVE NEGLIGENCE FOUND DESPITE EQUIVOCAL CONTRACT
LANGUAGE
In November, 1964, a Shell service station exploded seriously
injuring two employees. The explosion and ensuing fire were
caused by a defective heater located inside the station. Both Shell
Oil Company and Visconti, the tenant-operator of the station,
were aware of the defect but took no remedial action. The em-
ployees brought suit against Shell who in turn impleaded Visconti
on the basis of an indemnification clause contained in the service
station lease. The indemnification clause stated that Visconti would
indemnify Shell
against any and all claims, suits, loss, cost and liability on ac-
count of injury or death of persons or damage to property . . .
caused by or happening in connection with 'the premises . . .
or the condition maintenance, possession or use thereof or the
operations thereon.'
The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs in the principal action and
for Shell as third-party plaintiff in the indemnification action.2
The appellate division affirmed the verdict in favor of the
employees but modified the judgment by dismissing Shell's third
1. Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205, 210, 269 N.E.2d 799, 801, 521 N.Y.S.2d
81, 84 (1971) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
2. Id. at 206. 269 N.E.2d at 800, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
